The COVID-19 pandemic has transformed our personal and professional lives. At the US Federal Trade Commission (FTC), we have re-organized our operations and re-examined our priorities. I appreciate this opportunity to describe what remains constant, and where we have adjusted our efforts. Three critical points warrant emphasis: (i) traditional antitrust enforcement remains steadfast and vigorous; (ii) our investigation and business review letter processes have adapted for the good of all stakeholders and the public to the rapidly changing realities we all face; and (iii) our consumer protection enforcement efforts continue undeterred and undiminished.

First, we continue to pursue vigorously our traditional competition and consumer protection enforcement responsibilities. We worked to address the organizational and logistical hurdles imposed by stay-at-home orders. We set up a system to accept electronic filings of Hart-Scott-Rodino notifications for the first time. FTC employees have transitioned to working remotely, and the Commission is conducting virtual meetings. I have been amazed and gratified by our ability to adapt so quickly to these challenges.

Although the manner in which we conduct our investigations has adapted to the constraints of physical distancing, the substance of our work remains the same, and our traditional enforcement activities continue without significant inefficiencies. In the past few weeks, we have concluded four merger investigations: two were resolved with divestitures,[^1^](#jnaa022-FN1){ref-type="fn"} one deal was abandoned,[^2^](#jnaa022-FN2){ref-type="fn"} and the Commission moved to unwind another.[^3^](#jnaa022-FN3){ref-type="fn"}

In the area of merger review, we will continue to apply our existing standards to the evidence and arguments adduced by the parties,[^4^](#jnaa022-FN4){ref-type="fn"} and follow our experience in making complex decisions on mergers during the 2008 financial crisis.[^5^](#jnaa022-FN5){ref-type="fn"} Our antitrust assessment will reflect the best evidence of competition at the time, including the potential impact of the coronavirus emergency. Parties may claim that a merger provides benefits by enabling them to cope with the economic fallout from the emergency and those arguments will be considered. But parties that use COVID as an excuse for their anticompetitive merger will not receive a favourable reception, especially if their mergers pre-date the pandemic. Our assessment of efficiency claims will continue to require that they be verifiable, cognizable, and merger-specific, and the long-term impacts on competition remain at the forefront in our analysis.[^6^](#jnaa022-FN6){ref-type="fn"}

Secondly, we are also addressing a variety of concerns raised by the pandemic, recognizing the new challenges businesses and consumers are confronting. For example, together with our sister agency, the Department of Justice, we created an expedited antitrust procedure to provide guidance for collaborations of businesses working to protect the health and safety of Americans during the COVID-19 pandemic.[^7^](#jnaa022-FN7){ref-type="fn"} The expedited procedure notes, for example, that health care facilities may need to work together in providing resources and services to assist patients, consumers, and communities affected by the pandemic and its aftermath. Other businesses may need temporarily to combine production, distribution, or service networks to facilitate production and distribution of COVID-19-related supplies.[^8^](#jnaa022-FN8){ref-type="fn"} We and the Antitrust Division have committed to respond expeditiously to all COVID-19-related requests---we will aim to act within seven days of receiving all necessary information.

We recently reiterated our commitment to protecting workers, especially those workers on the front lines of the pandemic---doctors, nurses, first responders, and those who work in grocery stores, pharmacies, and warehouses, among other essential service providers---by using various antitrust laws against those who seek to exploit the current circumstances to engage in anticompetitive conduct in the labour market.[^9^](#jnaa022-FN9){ref-type="fn"} Companies and individuals who enter into unlawful wage-fixing and no-poach agreements may be criminally prosecuted by the Antitrust Division, and those who invite collusion may be subject to civil enforcement by the FTC, even absent a collusive agreement.[^10^](#jnaa022-FN10){ref-type="fn"} We may also use our civil enforcement authority to challenge unilateral anticompetitive conduct by employers that harms competition in a labor market. We strongly prefer that this conduct not occur in the first place so that enforcement actions are not necessary; we issued this statement to remind businesses that such conduct remains illegal during the pandemic crisis and the associated economic downturn.

We believe that these and other pandemic-related concerns will best be served by vigorous application of the existing antitrust and competition laws that we enforce. They are sufficiently flexible and far-reaching to account for changing market conditions, even during times of economic and non-economic stresses. As we saw during the 2008 financial downturn and other, earlier challenging times, 'emergency' exceptions to the antitrust laws are unnecessary and can be counterproductive. The National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, adopted in response to the Great Depression, is an example of a reaction to an economic crisis that likely diminished competition among firms, with little-to-no benefit (and more likely harm) to the economy.[^11^](#jnaa022-FN11){ref-type="fn"} We are wary of calls to relax competition policy, and together with our international counterparts in the International Competition Network, we released a statement last week explaining that relaxing, suspending, or eliminating competition policy can inadvertently harm consumers and producers.[^12^](#jnaa022-FN12){ref-type="fn"} FTC staff must and will continue to analyse carefully the potential effects of proposed transactions and business conduct.

Of course, we applaud socially beneficial cooperative efforts to combat the pandemic. As a result, we have emphasized existing guidance (for example, the Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors and Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy in Health Care) making clear that many such efforts to respond to the pandemic would be consistent with the antitrust laws. We encourage parties to seek further guidance where needed, invoking the expedited procedures described above where appropriate.

Finally, on the consumer protection front, our enforcement actions fighting deception and fraud continue undiminished.[^13^](#jnaa022-FN13){ref-type="fn"} We have seen evidence of businesses seeking to prey on consumers' concerns and fears regarding COVID-19 and related difficulties. We do not tolerate such abuses. Working with our sister agency the Food and Drug Administration, we have issued warning letters to a number of companies that have marketed their product by making unsupported claims that they can treat or prevent coronavirus.[^14^](#jnaa022-FN14){ref-type="fn"} More generally, we have reminded advertisers that substantiation is needed before making claims related to products associated with this serious medical condition. We have also worked with our colleagues at the Federal Communications Commission and warned Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) service providers against assisting illegal coronavirus marketing calls, and we are addressing complaints about coronavirus-related fraud, for example, regarding travel and vacation-related cancellations.[^15^](#jnaa022-FN15){ref-type="fn"} This week, together with our international counterparts in International Consumer Protection and Enforcement Network (ICPEN), we launched two new interactive dashboards detailing consumer reports about international fraud and scams.[^16^](#jnaa022-FN16){ref-type="fn"}

Although we will not tolerate businesses seeking to take advantage of consumers' concerns and fears regarding coronavirus disease, exigent circumstances, or financial distress, we recognize the need to remain flexible and reasonable in enforcing consumer protection requirements to avoid hindering the provision of important goods and services to consumers. We will condemn companies deceiving consumers, but in making enforcement decisions, will take into account good-faith efforts undertaken to provide needed goods and services to consumers. The FTC is ready to assist businesses that may seek guidance about compliance obligations on consumer protection issues during this unprecedented time.

I want to express my appreciation and admiration for the extraordinary efforts being made by FTC staff who remain dedicated to our mission, and indeed across the government, to continue to serve and protect the people of this country during this crisis. I am honoured to serve with them.
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